- Name
- —
- Photo
- —
- Tick
- Resumo
- A Nobel laureate explains matching markets where price alone cannot allocate, such as kidney exchanges, medical residencies, and school choice, and shows how market design fixes failures of thickness, congestion, and safety, offering a framework that applies equally to platforms and marketplaces.
- Comment
- —
- Year
- 2015
- Author
- Alvin E. Roth
- Index
- 21
- Editora
- Mariner Books
- Páginas
- 260
- ISBN
- 0544705289
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Gênero
- Economia
- Avaliação
- 3.9
- Status
- Quero ler
- Título original
- Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design
- Editora original
- Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
- Ano da edição
- 2016
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